For many years, there have been efforts to remove the 43-foot tall memorial cross on the war memorial on top of Mount Soledad in San Diego, California, as a purported violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. CLDEF has been assisting in defending against this attack on the Mt. Soledad Cross for over a decade.
Mr. Rudy is a patent lawyer who was challenging the patent application fee increases based on the ineligibility of Barack Obama to enact laws as President of the United States. The courts below ruled that whether Obama qualified to be President of the United States was a political question that cannot be entertained by the judicial system, having been given by the Constitution to Congress to determine.
Heien is a Fourth Amendment case involving a traffic stop for something that the officer incorrectly believed was a crime. Although the car should not have been stopped, the North Carolina courts upheld the police’s seizure of the car’s passenger’s illegal property because the police’s mistake in stopping the car was “reasonable.” Heien sought U.S. Supreme Court review, and CLDEF submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of his position. CLDEF’s brief critiqued the use of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test that has been routinely used by federal courts to justify intrusions of liberty through a multitude of subjective shades of grey. Instead, armed with an understanding that the Fourth Amendment protects property rights, the inquiry becomes objectively black and white — whether the government does or does not have a superior property interest in the person and/or vehicle it wishes to detain. Viewed in that light, the police had no right to stop someone who had violated no law, regardless of how “reasonable” an officer’s mistake may seem to a court.
Wurie was a Fourth Amendment case involving the warrantless search of a cellular phone pursuant to an arrest. The government argued that, any time it makes an arrest, it has the right to search a person’s cell phone without a warrant as a matter of course, “incidental” to the arrest. Wurie was convicted based upon information found in the search, and he sought U.S. Supreme Court review.
This was a First Amendment case involving an Ohio law giving the Ohio Election Commission the power to “proclaim” the alleged truth or falsity of statements during political campaigns. Taking a page out of Orwell’s novel 1984, and dubbed the “Ministry of Truth” by its critics, the law permits the government to decide what can and cannot be said about it. CLDEF’s brief argued that in the United States the people — not the government — are sovereign, and the government has no power whatsoever to decide truth and falsity. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson declared that “the opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction.” This case resulted in a successful outcome in the Supreme Court, and on remand, the district court struck down the Ohio statute.
The case involved a Second Amendment challenge to New Jersey’s concealed carry laws. New Jersey concealed carry permits are rarely (if ever) issued unless one belongs to the government and politically powerful ruling class. The lower federal courts upheld the laws, and New Jersey gun owners filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
As the federal government uses the term, the term “contraceptive” no longer describes ways to prevent conception. Rather, the term now includes terminating a pregnancy after conception occurs. Thus, many of what are now called “contraceptives” are really abortifacients — drugs and devices that induce a miscarriage and the death of the embryo in the womb. Under rules adopted after the enactment of Obamacare, the federal government seeks to require all employers providing group health insurance to provide these abortifacients, calling them contraceptives.
The Quinn case involves both the Second and Fourth Amendments, relating to a no-knock raid by the police. Police executed a warrant to search John Quinn’s home, looking for drugs owned by his son who lived there. Rather than honor the age-old practice of knocking on the door and announcing themselves, the police battered down Quinn’s door, shooting him when he understandably reached for his handgun to defend himself from what he thought was a burglary. The police justified the no-knock raid solely because they believed that Quinn owned firearms.
This case involved a challenge to Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (“NDAA”), which authorized military detention of civilians based on vague standards of providing “support” for an adversary of the United States, similar to the Japanese-American internment camps during World War II. Journalist Christopher Hedges and a group of journalists and lawyers brought this challenge to the NDAA.
This case arises under the so-called Lautenburg Amendment of 1997, amending the Gun Control Act of 1968. The government argued for an expansive definition of what constitutes a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence, under which a person who engages in offensive touching, pushing, or even spitting in the context of a domestic relationship meets the federal requirement of “physical force.” The penalty for such an act is a lifetime ban on firearms ownership, and even innocent efforts to purchase or possess a firearm can result in the person becoming a felon.
Abramski is a Second Amendment case challenging ATF’s use of its “straw purchase” doctrine to convict one eligible person who bought a firearm for another eligible person. When buying a gun, a person is asked on the ATF Form 4473 if he is the “actual buyer,” even though federal law only requires him to be the “transferee.” Congress never actually criminalized “straw purchases,” and it is not up to ATF or the courts to create new crimes in order to fill in the perceived blanks. The government argued that the gun dealer was “required” to keep information about the “actual buyer,” but federal law requires him to keep only the identity of the “transferee” — the person physically present to obtain the firearm.
Barack Obama made several recess appointments between Senate pro forma sessions, purporting to following Article II, Section 2, Clause 3, the Recess Appointments Clause. A challenge was brought against an action by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) against an employer who alleged that the NLRB action was invalid due to a lack of quorum because a majority of the Board members had received recess appointments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the employer, and the NLRB sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Cotterman was a Fourth Amendment case about whether the federal government can seize a laptop at a border checkpoint and copy the contents without a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion. Cotterman was convicted based on such a search, and he sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court. CLDEF’s amicus curiae brief, in support of the petitioner, argued that the case should not be analyzed based on non-textual “reasonable expectation of privacy” standards, but instead involved a “general search” absolutely prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. This would be no different than if the government seized a person’s firearms and copied down the serial numbers as part of a general search to see if they were stolen. CLDEF’s effort in this case continues to press for a revitalized Fourth Amendment principle to protect property, not just some watered-down notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy — an expectation which is rapidly shrinking in the digital age.
Moose v. MacDonald involved a challenge to Virginia’s “crimes against nature” statute. A federal district judge found that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that this law had been invalidated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. The state of Virginia sought Supreme Court review.
Woollard is a Second Amendment case challenging Maryland’s “good and substantial reason” requirement for obtaining a license to carry a concealed weapon. The district court held that the “core” of the Second Amendment applies only inside the home, and thus applied only an “intermediate scrutiny” analysis.